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Introduction

W

hat is "information warfare"? Is it nothing more than a bumper
sticker, used as a "quick fix" rescue for budgets and programs that
find it useful to attach themselves to the hot new concept? Is it such a revolutionary new amalgam of technologies and concepts that old and traditional
forms of warfare are soon slated to fall into the same receptacle in which outmoded military technologies such as the catapult and war galley slumber? Is
warfare as we understand it, featuring "blast, heat, and fragmentation," about to
become obsolete?1 The intent of this brief introduction to information warfare
(IW) and information operations (10) is to both explore these issues and present
the thesis that they are best understood in light of the environment in which
they take place-the information environment-and to explore the relationship of that environment to the specific topic on which this book is focused,
computer network attack.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Information Operations, Inforntation Warfare, and Computer Network Attack

What is Information Warfare?
A useful starting place is to trace the evolution of the term information
warfare itsel£ The earliest use of the term in the United States probably originated in the Office of Net Assessment, where in the 1970s Dr. Tom Rona was
investigating the relationships among control systems, a field known as cybernetics. Dr. Rona described the competition between competing control systems
as "information warfare," in the sense that control systems can be described as
the means for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, processes
which can be diagrammed and described with flow and feedback charts of
mind-numbing dryness and complexity.2 In 1993 the Department of Defense
published an official definition for the term, in a highly classified DoD Directive,
TS3600.1. There were actually several definitions, at differing levels of classification.3 Not surprisingly, this definition was frequently revised as the operational and organizational implications of the concept evolved. The current
definition has the record for longevity-more than five years at the time of this
writing, since the promulgation of the current guidance on information warfare
and information operations in DoD Directive 3600.1 on December 9, 1996. 4
The publication of Joint Publication 3-13,Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, in October 1998 probably ensures that the current official DoD definitions ofIW and 10 will remain in effect for some time longer. s
The present definitions leave much to be desired, however, ifone is hoping to
find explanations that clarify and explore what might constitute the character,
conduct, and intent ofIW and 10. But since one must understand what 10 is in
order to move to its less comprehensive building block, IW, these definitions do
provide a useful starting point:
Infonnation Operations: Actions taken to affect adversary infonnation and infonnation
systems while defending one's own infonnation and infonnation systems.
Infonnation Warfare: Infonnation operations conducted during time of crisis or
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or
adversaries.

There is actually a second sub-activity ofIO that is critical to national security in
the Information Age, namely information assurance (IA), defined thus:
Information Assurance: Information operations that protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
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authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and
reaction capabilities. 6
While these definitions throw a less-than-blinding light on their constituent
activities, there is one critical theme that they are intended to bring out, and
that involves "who" does them and "when" they are done. IW is clearly a military activity conducted under a special set of circumstances, whereas IA involves not only the military, but also government at all levels, and even
portions of the private sector. Therefore, 10 as an activity goes far beyond just
the military during conflict, to include the government and a wider range of
private sector activities than perhaps that sector or even the government
recognizes.
Most US service concepts ofIW rest in part on the concept of the "information environment." Whether described as an environment, realm, domain, or
whatever, there is a clear sense that information has become some kind of
"place" in which crucial operations are conducted. The Army's trailblazing
1996 doctrinal publication, Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, even
speaks of a "global information environment [and] battlespace" in which conflict is waged. The latest version of the USAF's basic doctrinal publication, Air
Force Doctrine Document 1, published in 1997, explicitly addresses the need to
dominate the information realm, and discusses information superiority as "the
ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same ... [it] includes gaining control over the information realm.... "7 Joint Pub 3-13 defines it somewhat differently as "[t]he
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow ofinformation while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." Both,
however, share the sense that information superiority involves doing something
to the adversary while protecting ourselves in order to control and exploit the
information environment. Using this philosophy, then, IW and 10 can be described as the struggle to control and exploit the information environment, a struggle
that extends across the conflict spectrum from "peace" to "war" and involves
virtually all ofthe government's agencies and instruments ofpower. 8 One appeal
of this approach is that ifone replaces "information" with "aerospace" or "maritime," you have defined air and naval warfare, or more appropriate to our purposes, airpower and seapower. Information operations can thus be described as
those activities that governments and military forces undertake to control and
exploit the information environment via the use of the information component
of national power.
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This immediately raises another question: what is the information component of national power? More than just another bit of computer-age terminological fluff, its origins actually predate this decade, starting with the strategies
developed by the Reagan Administration in its very real struggle with the former USSR. In 1984 the Reagan Administration issued National Security Decision Directive 130, US International Information Policy, which outlined a
strategy for employing the use of information and information technology as
strategic instruments for shaping fundamental political, economic, military, and
cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior ofgovernments,
supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.9
This is hardly a new concept, and clearly governments and leaders have been exploiting the information environment for centuries. Indeed, one could argue
that the stone carvings that Assyrian rulers made of conquered peoples and cities
being enslaved and pillaged were intended as much to cow and terrify current
and potential subjects as to inform archeologists thousands of years later about
what hard and cruel folks they were. Regardless of the fact that the information
technology being employed was stone and chisel, and not microchip and computer network, this was exploitation of the information environment for strategic political objectives.
Two examples from this century will suffice to illustrate the critical importance of this environment to national security. The first took place on August 5,
1914, when the royal cableship Telconia sortied into the North Sea and severed
all five of Germany's direct undersea telegraph links with the outside world.
After that date, the view that the rest of the world had of The Great War increasingly passed through a lens located in London. This enabled British information warriors to mount a very effective strategic perception management
campaign that eventually helped bring the United States into the war on the
side of the Allies, thus moving from strict neutrality to waging war to "make the
world safe for democracy." Great Britain was e}.-ploiting the information component of national power. The second example comes from the Cold War and
the efforts by the United States and some ofits allies to e}.-ploit another segment
of the information environment-radio-to weaken the political cohesion of
the Soviet Union and the peoples it controlled. Radio Free Europe did not by
itself, of course, cause the fall of communism and the Soviet government, but it
certainly had its role to play. It is perhaps instructive that certain elements
within the former Soviet Union still blame Western 10 for communism's collapse. 10 Yet since both these examples employed old information technologies-telegraph cables and radio-they also beg the question: what is the role of
the computer in all of this?
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A New Geostrategic Context
The previous examples raise the question of what is so new and different
about the current state of the "infonnation environment" to warrant all the fuss
about" computer network attack" and information warfare. The answer is fourfold: cyberspace, digital convergence, global digital omni-linking, and computer control of infrastructures, all of which are synergistically combining to
create a new geostrategic context for national security.
One's receptivity to the changes of the infonnation revolution is often revealed by the reaction to the word "cyberspace." At the very utterance of the
word, doubters and skeptics display intellectual and sometimes even physical
discomfort, while the "digerati" and those at ease with the technologies of the
infonnation age react as if someone had said "traffic" or "radio" or any other
commonplace tenn. Almost everyone is familiar with the use ofinfonnation as a
tool, a process, even a weapon-recall the earlier comment about "blast, heat,
and fragmentation"-yet while all of these remain not only applicable but even
vital to the new and evolving "American way ofwar," none in isolation goes far
enough. This chapter argues that the synergistic effects of electronic digital technology, acting in and on societies that are becoming increasingly infonnationdependent, have made infonnation into a virtual environment, with cyberspace
as its physical manifestation. Cyberspace, defined here as that place where electronic systems such as computer networks, telecommunications systems, and
devices that exert their influence through or in the electromagnetic spectrum
connect and interact, has always existed, but not until mankind invented technologies that operated via the electromagnetic spectrum did it become "visible"
and noticed. 11 A useful analogy is outer space. It has always been there, but not
until humans developed technologies for extending our activities into it and
used it to affect terrestrial affairs did we fully comprehend that it is another physical and operational environment in addition to the land, sea, and air. Outer space
does not have the same physical presence or properties ofland or water because
you cannot "weigh" it or "measure" it in a useful sense, but it nonetheless exists
because we can see the physical results of things that happen there. 12
The physical laws and principles that govern and delineate how systems function in these environments are the borders that fix their boundaries. 13 Submarines, for example, function very well in an environment governed by the laws
of hydrodynamics, but they cannot fly. Annored fighting vehicles function effectively on land, but they are useless in space. All of these distinct and unique
environments synergistically interact with each other, and the same holds true
for cyberspace. The devices and systems that operate in cyberspace-radios,

39

Infonnation Operations, Infonnation Warfare, and Computer Network Attack
radars, microwaves, computer networks-function because they conform to
and exploit the laws governing radiated and electronic energy. We can date our
use of this environment to the mid-19th Century and the invention of the telegraph, which was the first telecommunication system to operate in accordance
with the laws of this medium. I4 The following century saw regular and
ever-more technologically sophisticated advances in our ability to control and
exploit this medium-undersea telegraph cables, radio, television, microwave
relay, even communications satellites-that extended the reach oftelecommunications to continental and eventually intercontinental distances. We have increased the volume ofinformation that we can store, manipulate, and transfer to
previously unimaginable proportions, but it was only in the closing quarter of
the 20th Century that the fortuitous, perhaps even serendipitous, marriage of
these technologies with the microchip led to attainment of "critical mass" and
the emergence of cyberspace as a full fledged environment in which military
forces and society in general-politics, business, education, and more-began to
learn how to operate. Given this definition of cyberspace, we see the link to
computer network attack; cyberspace is the physical environment in which such
operations take place.
Cyberspace is the basic arena in which two additional developments of the information revolution are transforming the strategic landscape: the increasing capability to transform almost any kind of information into ones and zeroes, in
what is known as digital convergence, and the grO\ving Internetting of global telecommunications media in a condition referred to here as global ol1l11i-linkillg. Although these developments are distincdy different, they are at the same time
synergistic and interdependent. Thomas Kuhn suggested in his landmark study
of scientific revolutions that the history of technological advancement has not
been one ofsteady discoveries or developments, but rather one marked by spikes
or sharp advances that flow from extraordinary finds or revelations that yield discontinuous and revolutionary changes. IS Such has been the case \vith information technology. Advances in communication technologies prior to the middle
of the 20th Century were relatively linear-telegraph to telephone to radio and
so forth. The break point came with the invention of the microchip because the
synergistic advances in information storage, manipulation, and transmission capabilities made possible by digital convergence are happening at an everincreasing and nonlinear rate. These developments have occurred in two areas,
the speed ofinformation manipulation/transmission, and the volume ofinformation that can be manipulated/transmitted. The combination of these attributes
with computer-enhanced and controlled telecommunications systems have led
to the "omni-linking"·ofthe electronic digital world. In a word, the globe is now
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"wired." The explosion that has resulted from the application of the microchip
to communications technologies has formed the new science of telematics-the
marriage of computers and telecommunications.
Telematics has created a new operational environment. The technology of
the telematic age we use to exploit cyberspace is new, perhaps less than two decades old, and global omni-linking is inseparably tied to the emergence of
cyberspace as an operational environment. While current technology is actually
rudimentary compared with what the future holds in store-compare the level
ofaviation technology in the 1930s (biplanes) with what came just halfa century
later (747s and B-2s)-the omnilinking of the world is increasing every day, as
more and more computer networks and telecommunications systems tie together and pass the lifeblood oftoday's economic and political world ... digital
information. The degree to which our societal dependence on this environment
is growing is startling. Our military forces already depend on it. The Persian Gulf
War of 1990-91 simply could not have been fought in the way we fought it
without precision information for precision weapons, command and control
systems that enabled us to operate like a matador around a woozy and
half-conscious bull, or satellite communications links that enabled organizations
half a world away (NORAD) to monitor Iraqi missile launches and pass targeting information to Patriot batteries to engage the missiles. 16 Our microchip-driven information collection, storage, manipulation, and transmission
capabilities are so advanced, and the links that move the information around so
Internetted, that we worry that TV news commentators on the east coast could
skew election results on the west coast by announcing '.'analysis ofvoting trends
indicate candidate 'Z' has won the election." The global economy cannot function without the constant supply ofdigital electronic information. It has become
a form of energy or capital, and global business is utterly dependent on telematic
systems and capabilities to keep the world's economy going twenty-four hours a
day. Business practices such as ':iust in time inventory," or military techniques
such as ':iust in time logistics," cannot function without the digital information
that fuels it. In a very real sense, Joint Vision 2010,17 which could be called the
"new American way of war," is possible only if American forces possess "information superiority," defined by Joint Pub 3-13 as "[t]he capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow ofinformation while exploiting
or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." The "Internet" is neither a finite place nor a collection of gadgets such as routers and switches; it is a description of the increasing omni-linking of the world. Thinking of the Internet in
terms ofits users, such as "America OnLine" or "CompuServe," or in terms of
uses, such as chat rooms or E-commerce, is as shortsighted as describing
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aerospace in terms of an airline. While some dismiss this environment and the
Internet as merely entertainment or worse, this view ignores the fact that a very
large percentage of the information currently available on TV or in print would
fall into the same category. Few, however, would deny the impact ofvisual media on the American populace's support ofthe Vietnam War or the impact ofthe
printed word on democracy and freedom via the "Declaration of Independence" or "Emancipation Proclamation." What is different is that the Internet
and omni-linking make it increasingly possible for that televised image to be
seen instantly by an ever increasing percentage of the world's population, or for
that opinion-shaping paper to be sent to tens or even hundreds of millions of
people simultaneously and in their own language. 1s Digital convergence, combined with connectivity, adds up to the second major part of the fundamental
difference between the information age and the period "BMC"-"Before the
Micro Chip."
The final major development shaping the new geostrategic context is the
increasing reliance on computerized networks for the control and operation
of key infrastructures in advanced societies. The growing reliance on these
systems for the control and functioning of an increasingly large segment of the
infrastructures on which we depend for economic, social, political, and even
military strength is both a boon and vulnerability. As suggested by Chairman
of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Instruction (C]CSI) 6510.1, Defensive Information Warfare, "use breeds dependence, and dependence creates vulnerability."19 Whether it be the supply of energy (electricity, oil, gas), the management of transportation (railroads, air traffic control, motor vehicle movement), the transference of digital wealth (electronic funds transfer, digital
banking, control of stock exchanges), or the operation of the very telematic
media that supports the entire structure, look below the surface of almost any
segment of daily life in modem societies and one will find Internetted and
interlinked computer systems. 20
The degree to which this is invisible to the general populace is illustrated by a
real incident. In February 1996, Washington DC suffered a tragic but relatively
typical industrial-age accident-a train wreck. During a snowstorm a commuter
train collided with a freight train, and several people were killed. The investigations by the news media examined almost every aspect of the accident, including
the signaling system that provided instructions to the train operator (who was
also killed, heroically trying to warn passengers instead ofsaving himself) via the
ubiquitous signal lights that line railroad tracks all over the world. The news media focused on whether the operator saw the signals, whether they were properly
placed, or whether they functioned properly. None asked whether the signals
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had been electronically tampered with (they had not been), nor even raised the
issue of how the signals were controlled or where those controls were located.
They were controlled, of course, by Intemetted computer systems, and the
computers which control the rail signals for the trackage in Washington DC are
located at the operations center for CSXRailways, in Jacksonville, Florida, several hundred miles distant. This is an illustration ofhow deeply imbedded within
modem societies such control systems have become, and how unaware most of
us are of their functioning. 21
It is a government responsibility, however, to not only be aware of such developments, but also to take precautionary and preventive measures to mitigate
potential disruptions to the effective functioning of systems upon which the society and national security depend. InJuly 1996, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order 13010, which directed the fonnation of a unique
commission, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
or PCCIP, which brought together senior governmental officials and representatives from those private sector industries and businesses that comprised these
key infrastructures into a commission tasked with studying the vulnerability of
these infrastructures to disruption. While the commission examined both the
physical and cyber threats, they freely acknowledged that their emphasis was on
the cyber threat, in part because it was-and remains-less well understood than
physical threats. Their conclusion that the threat is real and growing might seem
unsurprising and perhaps even preordained, but nonetheless reflects the growing awareness that our very dependency on computerized control ofinfrastructures creates an inherent vulnerability that is at the heart of hypothetical
scenarios for infonnation warfare in which computer network attacks on critical
infrastructures "take down" key segments of those infrastructures and thus generate cascading effects on such systems as transportation, banking, or emergency
services. It was the need to respond to this vulnerability that caused the Clinton
Administration to issue Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 on May 22,
1998, establishing a national coordinator for infrastructure protection within the
National Security Council and creating an organizational structure by which
such threats and vulnerabilities could be mitigated. PDD 63 called for a public
sector-private sector partnership to develop cooperative procedures and organizations to assess the threats and vulnerabilities and create countenneasures, and
thus stands as a landmark step in what is now called computer network defense
(CND) against the threat of what has in some quarters been tenned
"infrastructural warfare" employing computer network attack (CNA).22 But as
perhaps the key element in infonnation warfare, is the computer network the
target, or merely the means to the target?
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Computer Networks, National Security, and the "Metanetwork"
This chapter has already used several tenus relating to computer networks
without defining those activities. The current ClCSI 3210.1,Joint Information
Operations Policy, dated November 6, 1998, currently includes three such
activities, defined thus:
Computer Netw'Ork Attack (CNA): Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves.
Computer Network Defense (CND): Measures taken to protect and defend
information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or
destruction.
Computer Network E},."ploitation (CNE): Intelligence collection operations that
obtain information resident in files ofthreat automated information systems (AIS)
and gain information about potential vulnerabilities, or access critical information
resident within foreign AIS that could be used to the benefit of friendly
operations.23
The thread that ties these activities together is the computer network. The
network may be the actual target, in the sense that the attacker \vishes to make
the network cease its function of transferring information. It may be the
means to affect another target, such as a database or other information-based
process, in which the attacker does not want to cut the network, but rather
use it in order to impact or degrade an adversary's decision-making process.
The objective of computer network defense is to prevent an adversary from
doing either of these to our networks. Computer network exploitation is specifically concerned with intelligence operations. While the dividing line between CNA and CNE may well be very murky-indeed, a single keystroke
might be the only difference-we will not discuss CNE or even eND further, in part because those operations bring along their own baggage train of
thorny issues and unresolved questions. CNA will be a sufficiently difficult
problem to address here.
Imagine for a moment that a warrior (the specific service or warform is irrelevant) has just destroyed a critical target, comprised of all the computerized databases contained in the enemy's central C3 facility. Does it matter if this was done
with a laser-guided aerial bomb, a five-inch round from a warship at sea, a
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120mm round from a tank, a ballistic weapon dropped from space, or via malicious programming code "delivered" by computer intrusion? The definition of
CNA cited above does not clearly state the answer, but it is this author's contention that the means used is immaterial; since the intent clearly conforms to the
spirit of the definition, any or all of the examples just cited could be CNA. In all
but the last case, however, warriors and jurists alike probably consider themselves to be on fairly firm ground. It is the last case that gives everyone pause. In
part, this comes from our intellectual and doctrinal desire for clarity. Warriors
seek to clearly distinguish between different kinds of operations so that they can
establish clear lines ofauthority and control. Unfortunately, this may not be fully
possible in the information battlespace. The example cited above could be air,
naval, land, or space warfare, in addition to being information warfare. This is
not unique to information warfare, although we do not often examine military
operations from such a multi-doctrinal perspective. During the October 1973
Yom Kippur War, for example, once Israeli armored forces crossed the Suez Canal in their counteroffensive they began destroying Egyptian surface-to-air missile forces, which enabled the Israeli Air Force to expand operations. This is a
wonderful example ofwhat airmen term Suppression ofEnemy Air Defenses, or
SEAD. Doctrinally, SEAD is a part of what is in tum called Counterair Operations-things done to seize and maintain control of the air. Thus, armored forces
were part of an air superiority operation at the same time they were engaging in
what ground forces would call maneuver warfare. This same kind ofdoctrinal flexibility must also be applied to information warfare and CNA.
The first aspect of CNA mentioned above focused on the destruction or negation ofa network. Regardless ofwhether this is accomplished kinetically-the
laser guided bomb, for example-or via cyberspace, the intent remains the same,
to prevent the adversary's use of the network. We will not consider kinetic
means further, since they are already well understood, but the use of the computer to negate another computer is less well understood. There is no need here
to discuss the intricacies and details of computer code, and such issues are addressed in great detail in a myriad of books on computer security and information technology. That said, a word or two on the basic context are in order.24
The basic objective of virtually any computer intruder or hacker is to be able to
operate ,vithin the system as ifhe/she owned it. Once this level of access is
gained, the pseudo-owner can then change programs, functions, addresses, and
almost any other aspect of the way the computer or the entire network in which
it resides operates. Thus, an intruder that obtains root access into a computer
network that controls personnel records, for example, could perhaps alter the
content of those records or change how those records are stored or transferred.
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The implications of this for the proper functioning ofany computer network, be
it military, government, or business, are obvious.
As pointed out earlier, modem technologically advanced societies are increasingly dependent on computer networks for a growing range ofsocietal and
national security needs. If the computer system that controls rail operations in
the southeast United States can be degraded, for example, it will slow down or
perhaps even stop the movement of military forces that depend on rail links to
move to their deployment locations. If the telephone system that supports Scott
Air Force Base, headquarters of US Transportation Command, Air Mobility
Command, and the Tanker-Airlift Coordination Center, can be severely degraded it could seriously hinder the movement of US forces overseas. If the energy management system (electric, gas, and oil) in the northeast could be
degraded during severe winter weather it might cause a refocusing of national
political and strategic attention away from a distant and perhaps poorlyunderstood overseas problem to an unfolding disaster right at home. Some ofthe
discussion ofinfrastructural vulnerability seen recently has given far too little credit
to the resiliency and robustness of these networks. However, while loose talk of
"taking down" entire national infrastructures is fanciful at best, it also remains true
that all of these infrastructures are in some degree vulnerable to intrusion and degradation. Examples as recent as the 1999 Kosovo conflict, during which a variety
of allied computer networks such as the NATO e-mail system came under attack
via what was a "denial of service" effort to overload the system with electronic
traffic, indicate that this will be an active battlespace in the future. 25
If the intent of a CNA is to partially or completely deny access to or use of the
network, defenders are faced with a thorny set ofproblems, but at least they will
probably be aware that the system has been targeted. When you receive multiple
thousands ofunanticipated e-mail messages within a short span of time in what is
termed'a "spam" or denial of service attack, you can reasonably assume that
someone-even though you might not know whom-means you harm. CNA
that does not attempt to overtly prevent use of the system, however, but rather is
intended to covertly subvert its purpose by changing the content, is perhaps an
even more difficult problem. Let us use the analogy of a pipeline that is carrying
jet fuel. In traditional, kinetic warfare, we would target it for destruction from
the air, and a smart airplane carrying PGMs would come along and neatly blow
the thing apart, thus preventing the enemy from refueling his jets from it. But
what if we did not want to be so noisy? We could send a special operations unit
to the pipeline, attach to it a small pumping device that injects a small but fatal
(from a jet fuel standpoint, atleast) amount ofsome nasty foreign substance, and,
even though the pipeline itselfis still intact, render the stuff flowing through the
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pipeline unusable. It is a perfect analogy for digital modification of data, and it
might be virtually invisible until too late. Let us assume that the computer code
for "bomb, 500 pound" is a combination offorty-four ones and zeros, while the
code for "bomb, 4,000 pound" is another combination of forty-four ones and
zeroes-almost, but not quite, identical. The opportunity for logistical chaos is
immediately apparent. If one eighth the anticipated number of munitions show
up at Base X, but all of them are too large for the aircraft at that base to carry,
some significant friction has just been il1iected into the air war. We have a long
history of instances where accidental but incorrect computer code in systems
that deal \vith telecommunications or energy has caused significant malfunctions
\vith those systems, and we have seen a growing number of cases of intentional
intrusion into these and other such computer networks. 26
The mindset of many senior strategic leaders regarding the computer still
seems to be that they are large, expensive, and stand alone in their respective
"data center" somewhere. The reality is just the opposite-for they are small
(and getting smaller every week), cheap (and getting cheaper every week), and
interconnected on a global scale. It can be a difficult realization that ifyou operate a computer that is plugged into a telephone, you are theoretically connected
to every other computer on the face of the earth that is also connected to a telephone, even if it is a cell phone-hence the strategic importance of what this
chapter calls "omni-linking," because the globe is literally covered with countless individual computer networks that are nonetheless all part of the growing
global "metanetwork" to which tens of millions of individuals, organizations,
and entire societies are connected. It would seem to be inescapable that as more
and more human activity is conducted in cyberspace via the metanetwork, it will
become a battlespace and an arena for conflict. But will it be war?

Information Warfare-Is it ''War''?
Perhaps a necessary starting point for this question is: what is war? Most members of the military and the national security community would have no difficulty recognizing Clause\vitz's characterization of war as "an act of [physical]
force ... a pulsation ofviolence."27 Too often, perhaps, the rest of the phrase,
"to impose our will," is forgotten. The reason for the force and violence is the
imposition ofthe will ofone political entity onto another political entity. The issue at hand now is the potential ability of political actors to impose their will
through informational means.
In the Clausewitzian paradigm, war was waged by a special class of act~)r5,
"warriors," on behalf of a special kind of political entity, "States." The warriors
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were the unifonned military-soldiers, sailors, later ainnen-and the States
were the legitimate and recognized holders of international legal authority to
engage in the force and violence of warfare. Almost at the same time Oate 19th
Century) as the Clausewitzian paradigm began rising to international prominence another force arrived on the scene, the international codification oflegal
norms for the conduct of war and the protection of certain classes of society.
These norms, first enacted a century ago (1899) at The Hague, almost immediately encountered two extremely powerful forces: the nature of the modem industrial State and the influence of new technological means of warfighting.
The modem industrial State possessed an unprecedented amount of killing
and dying power. Although this was clearly hinted at by the course of the American Civil War, the great European military powers failed to recognize it until
too late. 28 The result was the stalemate and slaughter of The Great War and the
Western Front, in which the amount ofdestructive force that the industrial State
could generate was matched only by the amount of destructive force it could
withstand. Twenty years later these same great powers demonstrated that their
killing/ dying power had actually increased, with the result that World War II's
toll far exceeded that ofWorld War 1. This was made possible by the State's ability to employ and draw upon power sources that cut across almost the full
breadth of society. These sources crossed the boundaries of what had been intended as sanctuaries and protected groups, such as undefended towns or noncombatants such as women. But did the concept of an undefended town mean
anything useful in an era of nationwide air defense systems ,vith flak belts and
fighter patrols? Was "Rosie the Riveter" a protected person when she and her
sisters left their homes to build U-boats or liberty ships?29 It became increasingly
obvious that the modem industrial State was a series of networks or infrastructures, and the American doctrine for strategic airpower in World War II was
based on exploiting this fact. The "industrial web" theory of targeting, developed at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s, came from precisely this paradigm and was based on the beliefthat if the critical nodes or" centers ofgravity"
(a 1990s adaptation of a Clausewitzian tenn) of an industrial State could be negated, the resulting stresses on the entire system would cause it to unravel like a
spider's web whose critical connecting points have been cut. 30 The result of the
interplay of these factors was a change in our paradigm of warfare, from the
"limited" dynastic wars of the 19th Century to the "total" wars ofsurvival-political, religious, racial, ideological-of the 20th Century.
A second critical factor was the development of new forms of warfare based
on the exploitation of new forms of technology. The first great revolution in
military affairs (RMA) of the last century was the adaptation of the internal
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combustion engine to warfare, and by the end of the century's second decade
warfare had become incredibly more complex than it had been in 1900 because
it was now multidimensional. No longer was warfare waged on the surface.
Now it went on below the ocean's surface and above both the sea and the land,
and military success became increasingly dependent on the successful coordination of operations in all three dimensions. Thus, the invention and employment
of the submarine and the airplane transformed warfare, a fact that was clearly visible during World War II in that no nation that failed to dominate all three environments was successful. To make the situation more complex, by 1945 it was
clear that any force that was unable to operate in yet a 4th dimension-the electromagnetic spectrum, or what has here been defined as cyberspace--would
have great difficulty operating successfully in any of the other three dimensions.
This trend has continued and been intensified with military exploitation of yet
another physical environment, outer space. The strategic and operational environment for warfare at the cusp of the new millennium now enfolds geospatial
awareness, global connectivity, and a host of new factors that have further complicated the art ofwar. Not surprisingly, the legal context for conflict, which includes the law of war and the complex series of agreements and treaties that
provide a framework for the affairs of State and conduct of statecraft, has been
outpaced by the technologies available to global society. At the outset of the
20th Century, issues such as unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing held promise of a disconnect between the law and war, while at its close
other issues, such as netwar or the weaponization ofspace, hint at further uncertainty in how States and societies will attempt to regulate conflict. The same two
forces that arose at the opening ofthe last century are still at work, with the notable difference that instead of the industrial age it is the information age that is
changing the paradigm.
In some ways, the impact of the information revolution on warfare is quite
apparent, and the application of advanced information technologies to traditional military capabilities and weapon systems-what could be termed information "in war"-serves to make "blast, heat, and fragmentation" work more
efficiently and effectively. Information used as a weapon, tool, or even target is
nothing new, even though the new technologies vastly increase its impact as an
enabling capability orforce multiplier. Sending target photos via secure fax from
intelligence organizations in the United States to air campaign planners in
NATO, thus enabling the destruction shortly afterwards of key Serbian infrastructure nodes via precision guided munitions, is an example of this fact. This
e:h-ponential power as an enabler is an important, even vital aspect ofwhat the Air
Force calls "information in war,"31 a critical foundation for information warfare,
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but it is not synonymous with it. Information warfare is a new warform that is
evolving from the synergistic effects of several new and unique factors, all part
and parcel of the information revolution.
This brings us back, however, to the entering question: is this "war"? Does
this fit with the Clausewitzian paradigm offorce and violence? Ifa State is able to
degrade an adversary's military capability, damage its key infrastructures, and inject great disorder into political systems or economic affairs, all without the use
of kinetic force and violence, might not the recipient of such effects argue that
they had indeed been "attacked" and were thus "at war" with the inflictor? During a recent exercise conducted annually at the Air Force Wargaming Institute
by students from all of the DoD's senior military colleges, the "red team" developed a war plan against "blue" that included information warfare attacks against
such targets as the air traffic control system, financial centers, energy distribution
network, and telecommunications infrastructure, with the intent of degrading
and disrupting blue's political will and strategic capability. The red team's objective was to seriously undermine the ability and will of both blue and its allies to
continue armed opposition to red's other operations. This exercise in information warfare-which the students named "Dangerous Opportunity"-might be
seen as a mirror-imaging of American attitudes and mindsets, but it also reflects
technological conditions and vulnerabilities that the information environment
may make available in any future conflict. It also closely tracks with recent publications by some senior Chinese officers, who postulated precisely such operations in their concept for "Unrestricted Warfare."32 But does this perspective
reflect any sort of consensus on what IW and 10 are?

Perspectives and Doctrines
Earlier it was pointed out that the terminology ofIW and 10 are still evolving; not surprisingly, so are the various operational and doctrinal concepts held
by the different organizations involved in the IW110 effort, both in the United
States and globally. It is worth some time to briefly explore some of these doctrinal and operational concepts. In the American military much of the future direction for IW110 will come from "Joint Vision 2010," published by the Joint
Staff in 1996, amplified in 1997 by "ExpandingJ oint Vision 2010: Concept for
Joint Warfare," and further amplified by '']V 2020" in the summer of2000.33
]V2010, as it is called, postulated several dynamic changes in the overall strategic
environment and the emergence of new operational concepts. A key hypothesis
of]V2010 is that dramatic changes in new information technologies will make
attaining and maintaining information superiority a critical requirement.
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Concepts such as Dominant Batdespace Awareness or Network Centric Warfare are based on the assumption that new information technologies will enable
US forces to develop and exploit networks of sensors, decision-makers, and
shooters that can operate far faster than their adversaries, and thus translate information superiority into actual combat power. 34
If the technologies of the information revolution are creating an informationbased RMA, it remains for the American military to bring this to fruition by creating organizations, doctrines, and operational concepts to exploit technological
advantages, and tum them into actual military capability.35 In 1998 the Joint
Staff finally published Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations. Like any such publication, it represents what all of the various coordinating parties could agree on, including the four military services. It is not a visionary document with radical new operational concepts, but it does emphasize
that 10 is not a technical capability, but rather a coordinating strategy for operations in the information environment, and it makes three critical points. First,
joint forces at all levels must organize to conduct 10, and every one of the combatant commands, such as European or Central Command, have created
full-time planning cells for 10. Next, the 10 planning process must begin long
before operations begin; it is too late to begin planningjust a few days before the
operation's scheduled initiation. Finally, joint forces must train and exercise in
an information-intensive environment and engage all of the applicable organizations, including perhaps private sector or combined-multinational entities.
All US services-Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force-have
approached IW110 somewhat differendy, viewing them through their individual warfighting lenses. The Army was the first service to publish specific doctrine
for 10, and Field Manual 100-6, published in 1996, contained eloquent language about the "global information environment [and] batdespace," as mentioned earlier. But the doctrine's perspective was clearly on the need to
"integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance the elements of
combat power," those being the rather traditional: infantry, armor, artillery,
and, to a lesser extent, airpower delivered via rotary-winged helicopters. The
Army has chartered an organization, the Land Information Warfare Activity
(LIWA) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to develop both concepts and capabilities for
10, and LIWA personnel have been active in the Balkans for much of the 1990s,
assisting Army 10 efforts there. The Navy views 10 as something that enables
fleet operations and makes those operations more efficient and effective. The
Navy's perspective on 10 also reflects the expertise and experiences ofseveral of
its different "communities," with two in particular, spacel electronic warfare
and cryptology, as having special interest and impact on 10. The Navy has two
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key organizations, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) at Little
Creek, Virginia, and the Naval Information Warfare Agency (NIWA) at Fort
Meade, Maryland, dedicated to its efforts to develop 10. While the Marine
Corps does not have a specific 10 doctrine or organization, it sees 10 as larger
than merely another weapon or tool to be used when appropriate, as something
that makes the entire range ofMarine Corps capabilities and operations more efficient and effective. Finally, the Air Force has perhaps the most visionary approach to 10, with several doctrinal publications that e}..l'licitly focus on the
information realm as an arena for combat and as an operational environment in
which operations needed to be coordinated with and integrated into those in the
air and outer space. It, too, has made organizational changes, and was the first
service to dedicate an organization to the effort, recasting the existing USAF
Electronic Warfare Center into the Air Force Information Warfare Center
(AFIWC) in 1993.36 None ofthese approaches are "right" or "wrong," but they
do reflect the perspectives of warfare and warfighting held by their originating
services. While some will see narrow parochialisms at work here, it would be
more optimistic to think that from these differing perspectives will come a more
robust, richer and more comprehensive concept for IW and 10 than we have at
present. 37
In a simpler time, ''joint'' would have meant the four services acting in unison, but that is insufficient for effective 10. Not only are there a range of
non-service DoD organizations that are critical to the military's ability to wage
IW, using the previously-cited definition ofIO means that virtually the entire
apparatus of the federal government is involved in some way with the national
security exercise ofinformation power. While perhaps only a handful offederal
organizations would be involved with CNA, others would be involved with
CNE, and virtually every one with CND, because in the information age every
organization is increasingly dependent on its electronic and computerized information networks for its efficient functioning. One of the most critical, if littlenoticed, segments ofPDD 63 was the tasking of each federal department or
agency's chiefinformation officer (CIO) with the responsibility for information
assurance within that organization. This ties into another ofPDD 63's critical
actions, the assignment of specific segments of the government to work \vith
their private sector counterparts (Department ofEnergy with the electric industry, for example) in developing the strategic partnership called for in the document. The latest National Security Strategy (December 2000) contains repeated
references to the critical importance of safeguarding national infrastructures
from intrusion or attack, whether that attack comes from the physical world or
viaCNA.
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While some feel that the US military's interest in IW and 10 is a reflection ofa
peculiar American affinity for technology and the degree in which information
technology is embedded within our systems and structures, the growing interest
of the rest of the world indicates that IW110 is not solely an American issue.
While this is neither the time nor place to make a detailed exploration of
non-US perspectives on IW110, a few examples are in order. The British military has been pressing ahead both operationally and educationally, as have most
of our other English-speaking allies, and their interest has included the pressing
need to provide CND to counter the threat of CNA against vulnerable infrastructures.38 Several other governments, including that of Norway, have undertaken specific PCCIP-type studies of their own national infrastructures
because of the growing awareness that national security, including economic
health and prosperity, depends on the smooth and confident functioning of
these computer networks. The Swedish National Defense College (Forsvarshogskolan) has integrated 10 into the core ofits curricula, and the other Scandinavian countries are following suit. The Russian and Chinese perspectives have
already been cited, albeit too briefly, and the views of one senior Indian national
security strategist are enlightening. Major General Yashwant Deva recendy
wrote that the "metaterritorial" nature of IW was blurring the boundary between peace and war, and he argued that India's national security strategy must
have an information strategy component to be effective. 39 These are perceptive
insights from a country possessing the world largest "Silicon Valley" and one
which is a global leader in information technology. Finally, the rapidly increasing use of cyberspace and computer networks for political objectives by
nongovernmental organizations, whether they be humanitarian groups such as
the Red Cross, political and environmental activists such as Greenpeace, or revolutionary groups such as the Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Zapatistas (Mexico), or
Hezbollah (Middle East), poses an interesting problem for governments and supra-national organizations that are uncomfortable working outside of the traditional and terrestrial boundaries ofnational security. In cyberspace all actors look
somewhat alike, and as some recent incidents such as the Solar Sunrise case have
illustrated, it can be very difficult to determine if the intruder is a lone individual
or the agent of a State acting for State-sponsored purposes.

Concluding Thoughts
Those old enough to remember sayings and slang from the war in Southeast
Asia may recall one that went "When you're up to your backside in alligators, it's
kind of hard to remember that your initial mission was to drain the swamp."
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Right now, in the field ofinfonnation warfare, we are hip-deep in the swamp of
unresolved issues, and there are a number of alligators circling. At the outset of
this discussion we faced the Clausewitzian paradigm ofwarfare, which was based
in part on the concept that wars are waged by ~'warriors" in service of identifiable States. In a postulated paradigm of war by keystroke, are those that operate
from the keyboards to be considered "warriors?" We have seen examples in
which young hackers, skilled at moving from database to database via cyberspace, never physically leaving their keyboards, have been inducted into the
armed forces of their home countries.40 Could this be used to provide a cadre of
super-skilled operators who now have the technology of States at their fingertips, instead ofwhat they can afford from Radio Shack? One thinks of the case
of the Dutch hackers who vainly offered their services to Saddam Hussein during
the Persian Gulf War. Could such individuals, if acting in the interests and behalf
of a State, be considered cybennercenaries?41 Equally plausible is the potential for
them to act on behalf, not ofa recognized State, but ofsome other interest group,
whether it have political, religious, or even simply monetary motivations.
Our existing paradigm for war requires kinetic actions, destroying things, or
crossing physical boundaries with physical objects such as airplanes or tanks.
What are the political and legal regimes for actions that do not cross the physical
limits of territorial sovereignty or cause kinetic destruction, but still have serious
impact on the national security of the "attacked" State? Where are the lines of
sovereignty in cyberspace, and how does the State respond to the provocations
and intrusions ofwhat may be a shadowy and virtual opponent? More and more
of the key infrastructures that support civil society also support, in a strategic
sense, the military power and capability of the State. Electric grids, oil and gas
pipelines, transportation networks, and telecommunications are just some of
those dual-use infrastructures and architectures that support both civil society
and military strength. Those kinds of assets have been attacked and destroyed in
wartime before, and they will be again, but what is the impact if the means ofnegation comes across the Internet in the forms ofbits and bytes? Just as troubling is
the question of who can and should defend those infrastructures? National
anned forces protect them against attack by "traditional" military means, but
does this mission extend into cyberspace? In the United States the answer from
PDD 63 seems to be that this is a shared public sector-private sector responsibility that will require the coordination and cooperation of those communities to
solve the problem ofinfrastructure vulnerability, but this may not necessarily be
the answer in other countries that have different political-economic systems and
traditions. These are just a sample of the questions and issues to be discussed and
analyzed in the pages of this volume.
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For more than a century and a half, from the era ofNapoleon and Clausewitz,
to that ofstrategic bombing and national liberation organizations, western political society has had a paradigm of warfare that has focused on the means employed: force and violence, employed to defeat or destroy the enemy's powers of
physical resistance. Information "in war" is a continuation of this paradigm, and
thus-as important as those capabilities are for the capability to employ traditional military force-is incomplete because of the new capabilities for influence, power, and the imposition of will offered by the new information
technologies. Information warfare and information operations do not replace
the older forms, but they do augment, modifY, and change those forms. The difference between the terms is important, even vital, and we dare not ignore it, lest
an adversary who lacks our bureaucratic and intellectual shackles and does not
"understand our rules" use our very dependence on computer networks to administer a nasty strategic defeat via the very same environment and metanetwork
we are so confidendy constructing.
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